A note on the impact of the internal organization on the accuracy of the information transmitted within the firm by Alonso-Pauli, Eduard & Bru, Lluís
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
A note on the impact of the internal
organization on the accuracy of the
information transmitted within the firm
Alonso-Pauli, Eduard and Bru, Lluís
Universitat de les Illes Balears
26 November 2019
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/97118/
MPRA Paper No. 97118, posted 02 Dec 2019 09:00 UTC
A note on the impact of the internal organization on
the accuracy of the information transmitted within
the rm
Eduard Alonso-Paulíyand Lluís Bru zx
November 2019
Abstract
We investigate the incentives sales managers have to transmit information on
demand conditions to headquarters under di¤erent organizational structures, and
its subsequent impact on rm performance. When headquarters chooses quantities,
their interests are aligned and reliable information is transmitted. When the choice
of quantities is delegated to the sales manager, instead, he prefers not to transmit
reliable information and as a consequence, headquarters set transfer prices having
poor information about demand. We then see that, due to this di¤erence in the
quality of the information available to headquarters, the centralized organization
frequently has the best performance.
Keywords: Organizational structure, transfer pricing, information transmission,
internal accounting system.
JEL classication: D21, D81, M21
1 Introduction
Good information is key for any decision-maker in an organization and especially for those
at the top of the hierarchy. Indeed, rms rely on internal accounting systems to provide
headquarters and all relevant decision-makers with the most accurate and up-to-date in-
formation available.1 Beyond the technical capabilities of the accounting system, however,
division managers may a¤ect the quality of the information received by headquarters (HQ
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1According to Zimmerman (2014), "An internal accounting system typically serves two purposes: deci-
sion management and decision control. Decision management refers to those aspects of the decision process
in which the manager either initiates or implements a decision. Decision control refers to those aspects of
the decision process whereby managers either ratify or monitor decisions." In this paper we thus focus on
the role of an internal accounting system on decision management.
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from now on). In particular, internal management reports combine the information gen-
erated by the internal accounting system with the discretion of the agent in charge of the
report to accurately transmit it.2 In this paper we study how the strategic incentives of
managers on information transmission interact with the allocation of authority within the
rm. We compare two commonly known and empirically widely observed organization
structures that feature a di¤erent degree of decentralization of decisions (Acemoglu et al.,
2007), namely more centralized rms in which divisions are organized as revenue centers
versus more decentralized rms where divisions are prot centers. We show that central-
ization aligns the incentives of the division with those of the HQ and how this leads to
better information transmission within the organization.
Below we analyze a rm, composed by the HQ and a sales division, that takes produc-
tion decisions under uncertainty. The HQ is assumed to maximize the rms prots (no
agency problem between shareholders and the HQ exists) and possess general knowledge
about market conditions. The sales division is run by a manager characterized by having
a better knowledge of the market conditions but it is biased toward the performance of
its own division. We will see that, when HQ organizes production activities in order to
maximize rms prots (delegate to a better informed but misaligned manager or centralize
activities to a poorly informed agent) she is concerned about the impact of the organiza-
tional structure on sales managers incentives to transmit reliable information about market
conditions.
The HQ can organize production activities in two basic ways. The contractual options
for the HQ are incomplete and, as in Aghion and Tirole (1994), she only chooses the
allocation of authority. The rst possibility is a centralized type of organization in which
the HQ takes all production decisions and the sales division becomes a revenue center:
here the division has a low degree of decision-making. In the second possibility the HQ
delegates production decisions to the manager. In this case, the HQ sets a transfer price
at which divisions internally trade, and the sales division, which becomes a prot center,
chooses which quantity to produce.3 Under a centralized regime, the HQ sets the quantity
to produce using only general information about market conditions: as a consequence,
the rm cannot adapt quantities to the real demand conditions. Under the delegated
regime, the HQ takes advantage of the precise knowledge of the manager and therefore
production becomes contingent to the actual demand conditions. However, the transfer
price only imperfectly reects the real marginal cost since it is set by the HQ who has
general information about demand conditions. The optimal degree of decentralization is
driven by the degree of congruence of interests between the manager and the HQ (as in
Aghion and Tirole, 1997), and by the relative steepness of marginal costs as compared to
marginal revenues (as in Weitzman, 1976)
In the information transmission stage (prior to the production stage) the manager
running the division reports the HQ about the demand conditions. The communication
stage takes the form of Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011): Given a
2Calvasina et al. (1995) provide examples of inaccurate internal management reports and argue in these
cases they become of very little use for internal decision-making.
3In decentralized rms a transfer pricing mechanism consists of a internal transaction in which one
division of the rm (e.g. the factory) provides an intermediate product or service to another (e.g. the
seller division). The transfer price appears to be a revenue for the selling division and appears to be
a cost for the buying division. Thus, divisions that are originally revenue or cost center become prot
centers. Since managers tend to be evaluated on the performance of his division, transfer pricing becomes
a powerful mechanims widely used to delegate decisions.
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particular internal accounting system, the manager is free to choose the accuracy of the
internal management report. We show that the choice of the organizational form has a
great inuence on the incentives of the manager to write an accurate report. Indeed, we
nd a bang-bang type of solution: when the division takes the form of a revenue center, the
manager provides the most accurate report possible while under a prot center structure,
a more decentralized structure, the report is highly inaccurate. Moreover, the incentives to
provide information are una¤ected by the degree of alignment between the manager and
the HQ.
The impact of the organizational structure on the incentives to transmit accurate infor-
mation goes as follows. When the division takes the form of a revenue center, the manager
have no authority over production decisions. The only mechanism to inuence the HQ
is through the transmission of information. Because the manager cares about revenues,
he becomes risk-averse to quantity missadjustment to demand conditions under this or-
ganizational structure, as a consequence, the manager becomes highly aligned with HQs
interests and provides the most accurate information possible. When the division takes the
form of a prot center, the HQ delegates production decision to the manager (who has a
better knowledge of the demand conditions) setting a transfer price to transmit informa-
tion over costs. The manager becomes risk-lover under this organizational structure and
hence prefers variability in production; as a consequence he dislikes to transmit accurate
information.
We thus provide a rationale for rms to centralize production activities when there
is transmission information both in centralized and delegated organizations. In previous
research, transmission of information only occurs in centralized organizations. When the
quality of information is exogenously given (as in Dessein, 2002) decentralization tends to
be the optimal allocation of authority, especially if managers biases are small. However,
when the quality of information is endogenously chosen by the sales manager (as in Deimen
and Szalai, 2019), centralized organizations leads to information of higher quality for the
headquarters and, as a consequence, centralized organization emerges more often as an
optimal type of organization. Thus we see that Deimen and Szalai results extend to
the case in cases in which delegation also requires information transmission to HQ. Our
analysis has also implications regarding the type of internal accounting systems: Organizing
the sales division in prot centers is more advisable when the internal accounting system
guarantees a minimum level of precision of the information transmitted to theHQ, whereas
an internal accounting systems that is capable to produce highly accurate reports but
requires management involvement to produce them should be better organized through
revenue centers.
Our contribution to the literature can be summarized as follows. First, we connect
two di¤erent literatures, the transfer pricing and the organizational economics literatures:
In our model, the headquarters delegates decisions using a transfer pricing scheme. This
is the most widely used mechanism by multinationals to coordinate units and decentral-
ize decision making within an organization (see Ernst and Young, 2001, Tang, 2003, and
Gox and Schiller 2007). Our paper adds to this transfer price literature that we analyze
the impact on performance of the fact that the local manager inuences the quality of
information. On the other hand, there is a literature on organizational economics (since
Dessein, 2002) that studies the optimal allocation of control when managers are biased
and may communicate strategically (see also Rantakari, 2008, Alonso et al, 2015 for more
recent theoretical analysis of this literature). We add to this literature the analysis of more
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explicit organizational structures (a more centralized one where headquarters set quanti-
ties versus another one where headquarters only set transfer prices) and a more realistic
approach of the delegated organization, since in our analysis headquarters still retain a
certain degree of control through the transfer price. We represent strategic information
transmission through a simple version of the model developed in the literature of Bayesian
persuasion (Gibbons, 2013, Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011 and Deimen and Szalay 2019).
Our paper also contributes to the accounting literature: By providing a formal analysis
on how the performance of an internal accounting system depends in part on the ability
of local managers to manipulate it, we can evaluate which is the optimal way to allocate
decision rights between headquarters and local managers. Simon et al. (1954) is the rst
analysis of this issue we are aware of, but the existing literature is mostly empirical. A
recent example is Indjejikian and Matµejka (2012) who show that local managers may take
advantage of more decentralized accounting systems.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the main elements of the
model. Section 3 shows the main result of the paper. To disentangle the e¤ects, we rst
show the case where the report is exogenously given and secondly we study the case where
the manager running the division chooses the accuracy of the report. Section 4 concludes.
All proofs are left in an Appendix.
2 The model
We consider a rm with a revenue function R(q; ) =
e   q
2

q, being e a random variable
distributed according to F () with mean  and precision   (or variance 
2
 = 1= )
commonly known to all agents. Production costs are given by C(q) = m q
2
2
; the steepness
of the marginal cost function, m > 0, will be a crucial parameter in our analysis.4 Firms
expected prots can be written as
EHQ = E
e   (1 +m) q
2

q

: (1)
The rm can organize its divisions either as revenue or prot centers. As argued in
Acemoglu et al. (2007), the rm delegates more authority on a more informed party, the
division manager, when divisions are organized as prot centers: Under a revenue center
organization, or simply R, HQ directly chooses quantities; when the sales division is a
prot center, or simply P , the rm adopts a transfer price policy, HQ sets a transfer price
p and then the sales division observes , the true demand conditions, and chooses quantities
taking the internal price p as given.
The sales division is run by a manager whose utility is
Um = HQ + (1  ) OF (2)
where HQ are prots of the whole rm and OF 2 fR(q; );Sg is the objective function
of the sales division, which depends on whether the division is a revenue center (and then
4In the analysis below we obtain qualitatively similar results if we consider a revenue function R(q; ) =e   bq2  q and a cost function C(q) = a q22 ; then the relevant parameter, as in Weitzman (1974), is the ratio
m  a
b
of the relative steepness of the marginal cost function with respect to the marginal revenue function.
Note also that we simplify Weitzmans analysis in that he considers both demand and cost uncertainty.
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the sales manager gives weight 1    in his objective function to revenues R(q; )) or a
prot center (in which case the division expected weights 1    in his objective function)
with expected prots
ES = E
ne   q
2

q   pq
o
: (3)
The parameter  takes values on (0; 1) and captures the degree to which the division
manager internalizes the prots of the whole company; a large value  ' 1 means that the
manager takes decisions almost as if he were the HQ while a low value  ' 0 suggests a
manager strongly biased to consider only the prots of the division. In the analysis below,
we take the value of the parameter  as a given.5
In the information transmission stage the sales manager sends a report to theHQ about
demand conditions. This report takes the form of an unbiased signal s = +"i, where the er-
ror "i has zero mean, precision  " and is uncorrelated with the true parameter , E(") = 0.
HQ aggregates all available information on demand conditions, both the initial information
and the signal, before deciding on either quantities or transfer prices. We assume that HQ
posterior mean about the demand parameter Ej s is a convex combination of the prior
mean  and the signal according to their respective precision,Ej s = (1  )+ s where
 = "
"+
2 (0; 1) is the precision of the signal.6
Although we assume the report to be perfectly veriable, the division manager can
choose, before knowing s realization, the accuracy of the report (formally, the precision
of the error term  ", that leads to precision  of the signal) in the interval  2 [ ;  ], where
0   <   1. Across rms, di¤erences of these bounds might be explained by the internal
accounting system implemented at each rm. In the rst place, the quality of the internal
accounting system would di¤er according to the level of previous investments on informa-
tion systems. Moreover, di¤erences in bounds may capture whether rms standardize their
internal accounting systems or allow division managers to inuence their design.7
We can summarize the strategic interaction between HQ and the sales manager as
follows: First, HQ chooses whether the sales division is either a revenue or a prot center.
Second, the sales manager sends a signal about demand conditions. Third, HQ update her
beliefs on  and production takes place: in a more centralized rm HQ chooses quantity
q to maximize rms expected prots while under more delegation of authority (when the
division is a prot center), HQ chooses a transfer price p and then the sales manager
chooses quantity q to maximize his objective function after observing demand conditions
.
5The degree of internalization of the whole prots of the company may come from the incentive contract
of the sales manager. In the most recent analysis of this issue we are aware of Crawford et al. (2018). In
their study, they estimate a value  = 0:79 for division managers of rms in the multichannel television
market, giving thus empirical support to an incomplete internalization of overall prots at the division
level.
6Formally, for the signal s to be a su¢cient statistic of  with Ej s = (1   ) + s we require the
prior and the posterior distribution of  to be conjugate distributions (DeGroot 1970, 2004 edition). More
generally, a conjugate prior is convenient, because it provides form-closed expression for the posterior. See
Fink (1997) for a compendium of conjugate priors.
7Indjejikian and Mat¼ejka (2011 p.287) o¤er anecdotical evidence on the degree of discretion division
manager have in their reporting to HQ. A business group controller states the following: "Let everybody
simply report in their own way, the way they think is most valuable to them, and if they think they have
enough information, then it must be the case that a higher level also has enough information"
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Therefore, the strategy of HQ includes the election of an organization structure in the
rst stage of the interaction and the choice of either a quantity or a transfer price in the
third stage; and the strategy of the division manager includes the choice of the signal
precision to maximize his expected utility and, if he is in charge of a prot center, the
choice of a quantity once parameter  is known. We solve the game backwards and we look
for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game.
3 Optimal organization structure
This Section presents the main result of the paper. To disentangle the di¤erent e¤ects, we
rst study in Subsection 3.1. the optimal organization of the sales division when the signal
is exogenous, namely, when the manager running the division cannot a¤ect the precision of
the signal. Then, in Subsection 3.2. we study the di¤erent incentives to provide accurate
information depending on the organization and we evaluate its e¤ects in terms of the
optimal organization of the rm.
As a benchmark, assume the HQ have full knowledge over the true state of the demand
parameter . In this case, the rst best outcome can be achieved under both organizations
and therefore how the rm is organized becomes irrelevant. Indeed, under a R organization
the HQ chooses the quantity that maximizes rms prot, i.e., qFB() = 
1+m
, whereas
under a P organization a transfer price pFB() = m
1+m
 leads the sales manager to choose
a quantity q(p; ) =  (1 )p
1+m
equal to the optimal one, q(pFB(); ) = qFB(). In either
case, for a given realization of the demand parameter  the rm can achieve under both
organizations the optimal level of prots 
2
2(1+m)
and expected prots yield8
EFBHQ =
1
2(1 +m)
(2 +
1
 
) (4)
3.1 Exogenous signal
Let us assume in this Section that at the information transmission stage, the manager can-
not a¤ect the quality of the report, that is, the manager sends a report with a given precision
 . Suppose rst that the division is a revenue center andHQ chooses the level of production
that maximizes expected prots after observing the realizations of both the exogenous sig-
nal and the public information. Thus, HQ maximizes ERHQ
 s = E ne   (1+m)q
2

q
 so;
the optimal quantity is
qR(s) =
Ej s
1 +m
= q +

1 +m
(s  ):
This optimal quantity can be decomposed into two terms: The rst one, q = 
1+m
, is
the quantity the HQ would choose if only public information was available; the second
element is an adjustment on quantity according to the additional information revealed by
signal s, increasing production if the signal suggests positive demand conditions (s > )
8Note that rms prots are increasing in rms volatility. When the rm is able to perfectly adapt
to changes in demand conditions, the rm benets from more demand volatility. This is due to the
complementarity e¤ect between the optimal quantity and the demand condition parameter . A formal
argument is presented in Appendix B.
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and decreasing it otherwise. The adjustment is larger, the more informative the signal is
(dqR=d > 0). For a perfectly informative signal ( = 1 and then s = ) the optimal
quantity would coincide with the optimal production level qFB(); a completely uninfor-
mative signal ( = 0) leads to production qR = q. By substituting this optimal quantity
on ERHQ
 s, we obtain expected prots
ERHQ =
1
2(1 +m)

2 +

 

These prots compare to expected prots (4) as follows:
ERHQ = E
FB
HQ   lR
where lR 
1
2(1+m)
1 

is the expected prot loss due to the inaccuracy of the signal. As
expected, a more precise signal reduces the prot loss.
Suppose now the rm delegates authority to the sales manager. Solving backwards, the
sales manager observes the demand conditions  and chooses q to maximize (2) for a given
transfer price p. This leads to
qP (; p) =
   (1  ) p
1 +m
Note that if  = 1 the quantity chosen by the manager is independent of the transfer
price and coincides with the e¢cient one, since in this case the manager internalizes rms
prots when choosing quantities. When  < 1 the manager is biased toward his division
prots and transfer prices transmit relevant information on costs to inuence his decision
on quantities.
The HQ chooses the transfer price that maximizes rms expected prots taking into
account the manager behavior just mentioned and using HQ information over demand
conditions. The optimal transfer price can be decomposed as
p(s) =
m
1 +m
Ej s = p+
m
1 +m
 (s  ) :
In the absence of the signal, the optimal transfer price is p = m
1+m
. Better information
allows HQ to set a more precise transfer price. When the signal suggests high demand,
s > , HQ set p(s) > p since large production costs must be internalized by the sales
manager. When the signal suggest dim demand conditions, HQ reduces the transfer price
since production costs are expected to be lower.
Firms expected prots under this more delegated organization structure are
EPHQ =
1
2 (1 +m)

2 +

 
+
1  
 
(1 + 2m m) (1 +m)
(1 + m)2

and compared to expected prots in (4) we have
EPHQ = E
FB
HQ   lP
where the expected prot loss is lP 
1
2(1+m)
(1 )


m(1 )
1+m
2
.
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Under decentralization, the expected prot loss also is decreasing on the precision of
the signal  , but the bias 1  of the manager toward his own division prots increases the
size of the loss. In our model, the manager uses two sources of information over costs when
deciding what to produce, the information transmitted via the transfer price and the true
costs of the company. How relevant is one information or the other in his decision process
is measured by parameter . In the polar case  = 0, the manager only cares about his own
division, and the only source of information over cost is the one transmitted (with some
noise if  < 1) through the transfer price. On the other hand, if the sales manager interest
are fully aligned with those of the rm ( = 1), he discards the information coming from
the transfer price and he chooses the optimal level of production q () = 
1+m
. As long as
 2 (0; 1) the manager uses both sources of information.
The following proposition compares the size of the expected prot losses under both
organizational structures and states which is the best one when the signal is exogenous.
Proposition 1 The optimal organization minimizes expected losses. A prot center is
preferred to a revenue center if lR > lP which holds whenever   b = max0; m 12m 	.
Our result naturally extends the basic trade-o¤ between prices and quantities in Weitz-
man (1974) by introducing managerial biases and the existence of a signal.
Indeed, if biases are maximum ( = 0) and no signal is available, Weitzman result
directly emerges in our model: The use of prices or quantities depends on the relative
steepness of the marginal revenue and the marginal cost. When HQ chooses a quantity
qR = q = 
1+m
it is independent of market conditions, and is too low when demand
conditions are favorable. When authority is delegated to the sales manager he adjusts
quantities according to demand conditions. However, since the HQ picks the transfer price
p = m
1+m
 before uncertainty is revealed, transfer prices transmit imprecise information over
marginal costs to the manager, and the manager asks for an ine¢ciently large quantity
when demand conditions are favorable ( > ) and the opposite otherwise. Centralization
of authority minimizes the loss when marginal costs are steeper than marginal revenues
(m > 1) and delegation of authority reduces the loss in the opposite case. Figure 1 (a)
graphically represents these e¤ects.
Figure 1(a) Figure 1(b) here
Proposition 1 also shows that having an exogenous signal does not modify the optimal
way of organizing production activities. Of course a more informative signal (higher )
leads to better decision-making and the rm reduces the loss with respect to the e¢cient
level (@lP
@
< 0 and @lR
@
< 0). However, the relative loss lP
lR
=

m(1 )
1+m
2
is independent of
the signal precision  .
The preference of one organization over the other is solely determined by rms costs
m (as argued above) and by the managerial bias  (Figure 1(b) graphically represents the
optimal organization structure as a function of these two parameters). Having a manager
that better internalizes overall rms prots leads to a more delegated organization: While
under a prot center structure, a manager more concerned about the whole company
(higher ) makes better quantity decisions (putting more weight on the real costs of the
company rather than on the imprecise information provided by the transfer price), the
manager running a revenue center makes no production decisions and therefore his bias
8
has no relevance.9 A change of regime from a delegated to a more centralized type of
organization may occur if the rms marginal costs increases and the manager level of
congruence is low enough ( < 1
2
). A change from a centralized to a more delegated type
of organization is recommended if, given m > 1, the manager running the division becomes
highly aligned with HQs interests.
3.2 Endogenous precision
In this subsection, we study how the structure of the organization shapes the incentives
of the manager to transmit accurate information to the HQ and the subsequent optimal
organizational structure.
In the information transmission stage, the manager running the division decides the
quality of the report, that is, he chooses the precision of the signal  within the bounds
[ ;  ] imposed by the internal accounting system.10 Proposition 2 shows the equilibrium
precision under each organization structure.
Proposition 2 If  < 1, the manager chooses maximum precision R =  when the
division in a revenue center while choosing the minimum accuracy P =  when the division
is a prot center.
Proposition 2 shows that the organization of the sales division crucially a¤ect the incen-
tives to provide accurate information. As in Deimen and Szalai (2019), when the manager
controls the quality of the information, a more hierarchical structure leads to a transmis-
sion of information of higher quality. Moreover, this e¤ect is independent of the managers
level of alignment .
In order to better understand the incentives of the manager when choosing the precision
of the signal  , assume that the manager is fully biased toward its own division ( = 0):
- Under R, the manager wants to maximize the expected value of the revenue function
R(q; ) =
 
   q
2

q, which is a concave function of q; hence the manager is risk-averse in
variations of q and thus clearly prefers less than more variation on quantities for a given
value of parameter . This manager thus prefers less variation on Headquarters decisions,
and this can be achieved with more precise information on demand conditions.
- Consider now the manager incentives on information quality under P : For a given
transfer price p, the manager maximizes R(q; ) pq, which leads to q =  p and division
prots q
2
2
. This is a convex function on q; hence the manager is risk-lover in q now. This has
a direct and an indirect e¤ect on his incentives when choosing the precision of the signal,
and both e¤ect go in the same direction: The rst, direct e¤ect, is that more precision of
the signal leads to less variation on quantities, but a risk-lover manager do prefer more
variation. The second, indirect e¤ect, is that more precision of the signal leads to a better
adjustment of transfer prices to demand conditions; but this implies higher transfer prices
when demand is favorable (to internalize the impact of higher production on costs) and
the opposite when demand is low; in other words, from the point of view of the manager
9This result goes in line with related papers regarding the decision to allocate authority in an organi-
zation. For instance, Dessein (2002) shows that, under exogenous information structures, the rm should
delegate decisions to a more informed manager as long as the bias is not too large (i.e. as long as (1  )
is not too high)
10If  =  the manager of the division have no choice of the precision of the signal and we are back to
the exogenous precision case.
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more information leads transfer price to work as an "insurance" that smooth quantities.
But a risk-lover manager is against an insurance policy, and hence prefers less correlation
of transfer prices to demand conditions.
If  > 0, any manager is partially aligned with the interest of the whole rm, and
rms prots increase with more accurate information no matter the organizational choice
selected (@lP
@
< 0 and @lR
@
< 0), that is, more information allows the HQ to make better
decisions. Proposition 2 states that, unsurprisingly, under R the manager chooses maxi-
mum precision. Anyway expected prots (4) are achieved by centralizing activities only
if the signal can perfectly inform about demand conditions,  = 1. Strikingly, however,
under P the manager still prefers minimum accuracy for any  > 0. The intuition is that
a manager that internalizes the prots on the whole company considers the real costs C(q)
instead of the transfer price p when choosing quantities; but the precision of the signal is
irrelevant when the decision maker already observes . Hence, even if  > 0 (as long as
 < 1) the only relevant aspect for the manager is the impact of the precision of the signal
on the expected prots of the division. Expected prots (4) can only be achieved if the
manager is fully aligned with the rm,  = 1.11
Similarly to Proposition 1, the decision to centralize or decentralize will depend on the
organization that minimizes the losses with respect to the e¢cient allocation. According
to Proposition 2, the loss under centralization is now elR = 12(1+m) (1 ) < lR whereas the
loss under decentralization is elP = 12(1+m) (1 ) m(1 )1+m 2 > lP . Since more (less) reliable
information exists under centralization (decentralization), losses are lower (higher) than in
the exogenous case. Comparing the relative losses leads to the following result.
Proposition 3 When precision is chosen by the division manager, a prot center is pre-
ferred to a revenue center if and only if expected losses are lower under a prot cen-
ter, elR > elP . This happens when    = maxn0; m m(;)m(1+m(;))o ; where we dene
m ( ; ) =
q
1 
1 
2 [0; 1).
Proposition 3 extends the result obtained in Proposition 1 by taking into account the
incentives from managers running the division to provide accurate information . Figure 2
shows the optimal organizational form as a function of the cost function parameter m and
the degree of alignment  both when the precision is exogenous (dashed line; threshold b)
and when the precision is endogenous (solid line; threshold ). Similarly to the exogenous
case, higher marginal costs and a manager biased toward its own division push toward
a centralized organization. Yet, under endogenous selection of precision, a centralized
organization emerges more often as an optimal allocation of authority. The threshold 
that separates the two organizational regimes is now a¤ected by the actual bounds of the
rms internal accounting system,  and  , through m ( ; ). Keeping the managerial bias
 xed, the delegation region gets smaller when m ( ; ) is closer to cero (and expands
when m ( ; ) is closer to 1). Besides, for lower values of m ( ; ), organizing the rm as
a prot center makes sense only if the managers alignment increases (d=dm < 0).
Notice that how to organize the sales division crucially depends on the threshold
m ( ; ) which is a function of the bounds  and  generated by the internal account-
ing system. Note that, as long as  < 1, it is the di¤erence between those bounds rather
11Note that at  = 1 the manager always chooses qP = qFB irrespective of the quality of the information
transmission.
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than the actual value what determines this threshold and eventually a¤ects the optimal
way of organizing the sales division. Thus, standardized internal accounting systems that
restrict the managers ability to control the quality of internal management reports are
more suitable in prot centers type of organizations. Instead, organizing the sales divisions
as a revenue center is more compatible with internal accounting systems that give the
manager of the division higher discretion to write internal management reports.
Also, Proposition 3 provides useful insights about the quality of the internal accounting
systems: There is no a direct relationship between the quality of the internal accounting
system and the organization of the sales division. To see this, Figure 2 (b) graphically
represents the optimal decision to organize the sales division as a prot or a revenue center
as a function of the bounds of the internal accounting system. The solid line depicted
in the gure represents all possible combinations of these bounds such that the rm is
indi¤erent between organizing the unit as a revenue or as a prot center. Note that rms
prots increase along this solid line but the indi¤erence decision remains.12 Finally, above
(below) this solid line, the gap between bounds is larger (lower) and the rm should organize
the rm as a revenue center (prot center).
Therefore investments a¤ecting the quality of the internal accounting system (the
bounds of the system) should be balanced with the organization of the sales division:
investments that reduce (increase) the gap between bounds makes organizing sales division
as a prot center (revenue center) more attractive. When the rm organizes its division as
a revenue center, investments that improve the upper bound  are recommended without
hesitation whereas those a¤ecting the lower bound  make sense only if the improvement
allows the rm to change regime and organize the rm as a prot center (an opposite
argument works for the prot center case).
Figure 2(a) Figure 2(b) here
4 Conclusions and further research
The main goal of this paper has been to show the interplay between the managers in-
centives to transmit reliable information to Headquarters and the organizational structure.
When the quality of information is exogenous, the decision to delegate production decisions
depends on the bias of the manager and on the relative steepness of marginal cost and mar-
ginal revenues. When in addition managers have control over the quality of information,
in a centralized organization the manager interests are aligned with the headquarters and
high quality of information is transmitted within the rm. Instead, under a decentralized
organization we show that the manager is unwilling to transmit high quality information
to headquarters. Thus, when taking into account that managers may control the quality
of information, the optimal allocation of authority tends to shift toward more centralized
hierarchies. Our analysis also suggests that internal accounting systems that constrain
managers discretion to a¤ect the quality of the report may soften the delegation problem,
and that those internal accounting systems that provide division managers with broad
discretion only work correctly under more centralized production organizations.
12The solid line is  = 1     (m;) +   (m;)  where   (m;) =

m(1 )
1+m
2
and  > b holds. This
implies that the bisector line is a case in which P is preferred to R and whenever  = 1 R is preferred to
P
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A natural extension of our research would be to study the optimal allocation of author-
ity when agents, in addition to controlling the quality of information, can communicate
unveriable information (cheap talk) and analyze the way those channels of communication
interact each other (similarly to the analysis in Bertomeu and Marinovic, 2015 or Deimen
and Szalay, 2019). Another relevant issue that has not been addressed in this paper is how
analysis extends when several divisions are implied in the information transmission process
instead of just one and issues of coordination among divisions (as in Rantakari (2008) and
Alonso et al. (2015)) emerge.
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5 Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. In this proof, we rst solve the problems for the centralized
organization and the decentralized organization. Then we nd the loss function lR and lP
and compare them. (I) Under R, HQ solves
max
fqg
EHQj s = E

  
(1 +m) q
2

q
 s
and the optimal quantity under R is obtained by solving the rst order condition,
qR =
Ej s
1 +m
=
1
1 +m
(+  (s  ))
Plugging qR into HQj s we obtain that
ERHQ
 
qR
 s = E    (+  (s  ))
2

(+  (s  ))
1 +m

=
1
2 (1 +m)
E f(2   (+  (s  ))) (+  (s  ))g
=
1
2 (1 +m)
E f((2  ) (   ) +   ") (+  (   ) + ")g
=
1
2 (1 +m)

2 + (2  ) 
1
 
   2
1
 "

=
1
2 (1 +m)

2 + 2
1
 
   2

1
 
+
1
 "

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ERHQ
 
qR
 s = 1
2(1 +m)

2 +

 

=
1
2(1 +m)

2 +
1
 
 
(1  )
 

=
1
2(1 +m)

2 +
1
 

 
1
2(1 +m)
(1  )
 
= EFBHQ   lR
(II) Under transfer pricing, the production stage is divided in two substages. First, the HQ
announces a transfer price, and second the division chooses the quantity after observing the
true demand conditions. Solving backwards, the division maximizes Um = +(1  ) S,
then the optimal quantity is the solution to maximize
+ (1  ) S = 

  
1 +m
2
q

q

+ (1  )

  
1
2
q   p

q
the rst order condition implies that
@ (+ (1  ) S)
@q
= 0()  (   (1 +m) q) + (1  ) (   q   p) = 0
()    (1  ) p  q (1 +m) = 0
() q =
   (1  ) p
1 +m
= qP (; p)
Given qP (; p), the HQ chooses the transfer price p that maximizes rms expected prots,
that is,
max
fpg
EHQ = E

  
(1 +m) q (p)
2

q (p)

First order conditions
E f(q0 (p)  (1 +m) q (p) q0 (p))g = 0
E



  (1  )
1 +m

  (1 +m)

   (1  ) p
1 +m

  (1  )
1 +m

= 0
(1  )
1 +m
E

  + (1 +m)

   (1  ) p
1 +m

= 0
1  
1 +m
E

1  
1 +m

m  

1  
1 +m

(1  ) p

= 0
1  
1 +m
2
E f(m   (1 +m) p)g = 0
leading to
p (s) =
m
1 +m
Ej s =
m
1 +m
(+  (s  )) = p+
m
1 +m
 (s  )
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Plugging this in rms prot function it leads to
EPHQ =
1
2 (1 +m)

2 +

 
+
(1  )
 
(1 + 2m m) (1 +m)
(1 + m)2

=
1
2 (1 +m)

2 +
1
 
 
(1  )
 
+
(1  )
 
(1 + 2m m) (1 +m)
(1 + m)2

=
1
2 (1 +m)

2 +
1
 

 
1
2 (1 +m)
(1  )
 

1 
(1 + 2m m) (1 +m)
(1 + m)2

= EFBHQ  
1
2 (1 +m)
(1  )
 

m (1  )
(1 + m)
2
= EFBHQ   lP
Now it is left to compare lP and lR. Note that lP =
1
2(1+m)
(1 )


m(1 )
(1+m)
2
 lR =
1
2(1+m)
(1 )

()

m(1 )
1+m
2
 1 ()   m 1
2m
. Since   0 the inequality holds for
all m < 1. Thus, lP  lR ()   b = max0; m 12m 	
Proof of Proposition 2. We have to show @EU
R
m
@
= @E(+(1 )R)
@
> 0 and that
@EUPm
@
= @E(+(1 )S)
@
< 0. Under R, the manager running the division chooses the
level of precision that maximizes expected utility when OF = R (q) =
 
   q
2

q. Given
that qR = Ejs
1+m
= 1
1+m
(+  (s  )), expected revenues of the division can be expressed
as a function of rms expected prots in the following way, ER =  (m)EC where
 (m) = 1+2m
1+m
2 (1; 2). Therefore, the expected utility of the manager running the division
under R is simply
EURm = E
R
HQ
 
qR

+ (1  )  (m)ERHQ
 
qR

= ERHQ (+ (1  )  (m))
Since
@ER
HQ
@
> 0 the utility of the manager also increases with the precision of the signal,
that is, @EU
R
m
@
= @E(+(1 )RSD)
@
> 0.
Under P , the expected utility of the manager is
EUPm = EHQ + (1  )ESD
and noting that q =  (1 )p
1+m
and p (s) = m
1+m
Ej s = m
1+m
(+  (s  )), and after some
algebra, we can show that the rst element of the former equation is
EHQ =
 
2 (1 + m)2 (1 +m) + 1

(1 +m)2 (1 m+ 2m) + 

m2 (1 +m) (1  )2
2 (1 + m)2 (1 +m)2
!
and the second element can be rewritten as
ES =
 
2 (1 + m)2 + 1

(1 +m)2 (1 + 2m)
2 (1 + m)2 (1 +m)2
!
 
 


m (1 + m) (2 +m+ m) + 

m2 (1 +m) (1  )
2 (1 + m)2 (1 +m)2
!
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It is clear that
@EHQ
@
> 0 and @ES
@
< 0. Now it is left to show that @U
D
m
@
< 0. Noting that
the last elements of the two equations cancel one another when there are weighted by 
and (1  ) respectively, we get that
EUDm = EHQ + (1  )ES
= 
 
2 (1 + m)2 (1 +m) + 1

(1 +m)2 (1 m+ 2m)
2 (1 + m)2 (1 +m)2
!
+(1  )
 
2 (1 + m)2 + 1

(1 +m)2 (1 + 2m)  

m (1 + m) (2 +m+ m)
2 (1 + m)2 (1 +m)2
!
and this can be easily rewritten as
EUDm =
1
2 (1 + m)
 
2

1 + m
1 +m
2
+
1
 
 

 
m
(1 +m)2
(1  ) (2 +m+ m)
!
Now it is clear that @EU
D
m
@
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. The rm chooses a decentralized over a centralized structure
when lP < lR that is, whenever
1
2(1 +m)
 
1  P

 

m (1  )
1 + m
2

1
2(1 +m)
 
1  R

 
Under endogenous choice of precision, P =  and R = 
1
2(1 +m)
(1  )
 

m (1  )
1 + m
2

1
2(1 +m)
(1  )
 
That is, whenever,
(1  )

m (1  )
1 + m
2
 (1  )
let us dene m =
q
(1 )
(1 )
< 1 and solve for  then
m (1  )
1 + m
2
 (m)2 ()
m (1  )
1 + m
 m ()  
m m
m (1 +m)
and since   0 loss under delegation is lower than under centralization if    =
max
n
0; m m
(;)
m(1+m(;))
o
. Note that it is immediate to check that   b() m < 1.
6 Appendix B.
In this small comment, we show the complementarity between demand conditions  and
quantity decisions. Assume full knowledge of the demand intercept , then no organiza-
tional problems exists and the HQ aims to maximize rms prots. Assume rms prots
can be expressed in the following way
R (; q)  C (q)
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Then, the quantity q that maximizes rms prots solves the FOC
Rq (; q)  Cq (q) = 0:
and by IFT
dq
d
=  
Rq
Rqq   Cqq
Note that dq
d
? 0 () Rq ? 0, that is, the rm should increase production under an
increase of the demand condition  if Rq > 0 (and reduce it otherwise). Now, evaluating
rms prots at q, R (; q ())   C (q ()), and analyzing the behavior of this function
(using the envelope theorem), the function is convex if
R (; q
 ()) +Rq
dq
d
> 0
A necessary condition for the convexity of the prot function is Rq > 0 and holds for the
particular function used in this model since R = 0 and Rq
dq
d
= 1
1+m
> 0.
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